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THE STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIALIST: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
NICHOLAS WOLFSON* AND THOMAS A. Russo**
INTRODUCTION
The Specialist as a member of a stock exchange has two
functions.' He must execute orders which other members of an
exchange may leave with him when the current market price is away
from the price of the orders. By executing these orders on behalf of the
other exchange members when the market price reaches the price
stated on these orders,2 the specialist makes it possible for these
members to perform their business elsewhere on the Floor. In
handling these orders, the specialist acts as broker or agent. In
addition to the brokerage functions, however, he has historically had
the additional function of acting as dealer or principal for his own
account. Under current rules and regulations of the exchanges and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, purchases and sales for his
own account must be made, insofar as reasonably practicable, with a
view to assuring a fair and orderly market in the stocks which he
services. Moreover, whenever there are public buyers but no public
sellers, or public sellers but no public buyers, he is expected, within
reasonable limits, to buy or sell for his own account in order to
decrease price differences between transactions and to add depth to
* Assistant Director, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange
Commission. A.B. 1953, Columbia University; J.D. 1956, Harvard University.
** Staff Attorney, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission.
A.B. 1965, Fordham University; M.B.A. 1969, J.D. 1969, Cornell University.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees. The opinions expressed in this article are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Securities and Exchange
Commission or of the authors' colleagues upon the staffofthe Commission.
1. For general discussions of the functions of specialists and the procedures utilized in their
operations, see G. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 203-18 (3d ed. 1963); NYSE, Now, ABOUT
THE SPECIALIST.. . (1969); B. SHULTZ, THE SECURITIES MARKET-AND How IT WORKS 124-
52 (rev. ed. 1963). See also SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 57-
171 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]; E. Wheeler & F. Graham, The Specialist Firm,
in THE STOCK MARKET HANDBOOK 911-15 (G. Kerekes & F. Zarb ed. 1970).
2. See generally B. SHULTZ, supra note 1, at 95-99. The specialist has traditionally
maintained a loose-leaf notebook or "book" for recording outstanding orders, but the NYSE is
currently considering modernizing the "book" with an electronic system utilizing a television-
like display. NYSE ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1969).
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the market. He performs both functions for a limited number of issues
assigned to him by the stock exchange3
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In 1935 the Twentieth Century Fund's study of the securities
market concluded that:
Specialists, as well as other exchange members, should be permitted to function
either as traders or as brokers, but not as both. . . .No specialist, or other
broker, should be permitted to have any interest in any trading account, pool,
syndicate, underwriting operation or option!
The Fund's basis for this conclusion was its belief that "the services
rendered by the specialist are not of sufficient value to warrant the
continuation of a condition where a small group of persons is given a
preferred position in the market." 5
One year later the Securities and Exchange Commission in
studying the same system reached the conclusion that insufficient data
had been presented to justify the segregation of functions.' In 1941
Professor Vernon, then a member of the Commission staff, suggested
an alternative to considering the specialist in terms of his general
beneficial or detrimental effect on the market as both the Twentieth
Century Fund and Segregation Report had done. He stated that the
feasibility of regulating the specialist should be viewed
in terms giving recognition to the possibility that his job may vary in different
types of stocks . . . . [T]he dealer role of specialists may be necessary and
justifiable for one set of stocks, providing sufficient grounds for overlooking
his advantage over the public as a dealer in such issues, while his dealer position
in another group of stocks runs contrary to the public interest
In actively traded issues where a sufficient number of buyers and
sellers exists to assure a continuous market with each sale price
related to the prior sale, Vernon reasoned, little justification for the
specialist function exists. He recognized the need for greater study to
3. Certain inactively traded securities are designated as "cabinet" securities. Bids and offers
are written on cards which are filed in the "cabinet." When a bid and offer match, the respective
members are notified, and the trade is consummated. For rules relating to these cabinet
securities, see New York Stock Exchange [hereinafter cited as NYSE] iule 85.
4. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 685 (1935).
5. Id. at 684.
6. SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF
THE FUNCTIONS uF DEALER AND BROKER 109 (1936) [hereinafter cited as SEGREGATION
REPORT].
7. R. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE ME BERS 96 (194 1) [hereinafter cited
as VERNON].
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effectively develop such segmented rules regulating the specialist's
activity.
Little was written on the specialist system in the exhaustive
manner of the Twentieth Century Fund, the Segregation Report, and
Vernon's book until 1963 when the Commission's Special Study8
reported that "in its present form, [the specialist system] appears to
be an essential mechanism for maintaining continuous auction
markets and, in broad terms, appears to be serving its purposes
satisfactorily."' With the adoption of rule 1 lb-110 which recognized
both the dealer and broker functions of the specialist, the issue seemed
finally settled, at least from a legal standpoint, that the specialist
system's beneficial effects surpassed any defects.
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE SPECIALIST
Several important questions should be examined to acquire an
understanding of the economic motivations -present in the specialist
system and of the impact of the specialist on market prices. To what
extent is the specialist's monopolistic, or oligopolistic power to
administer the price of his specialty stock limited by his obligation to
maintain a fair and orderly market? Can a specialist be a speculator
and still meet this obligation? What do the terms "fair market" and
"orderly market" mean?
In any economic categorization of the specialist's function, the
specialist's position as the price administrator of his specialty stock
requires analysis. To the extent that he is a sole" price administrator,
he may be considered a monopolist 2 Professor Baumol comments
8. In 1962 the Commission staff finished an extensive study of the specialist system on the
American Stock Exchange [hereinafter cited as Amex]. SEC, STAFF REPORT ON
ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN
STOCK EXCHANGE (1962).
9. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 167.
10. 17 C.F.R.240.1lb-I (1970).
11. Although each NYSE stock currently utilizing the specialist sytem has only one
specialist, this was not always the case. The Segregation Report noted that in 1936 "stocks
which enjoy considerable trading activity have as many as six competing specialists."
SEGREGATION REPORT 26. At the time of the Special Study a "few of the [specialist] units [were]
registered in the same stocks and compete[d] with each other." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 67.
12. One economist, Harold Demsetz, stated that while some believe that "scale economics"
exist with respect to the specialist suggesting a "natural monopoly," there are many sources of
competition to the specialist. Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 1968 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 33, 42. Listing the main types of competition as "(1) rivalry for the specialist's job,
(2) competing markets, (3) outsiders who submit limit orders rather than market orders, (4)
floor traders who may bypass the specialist by crossing buy and sell orders themselves, and (5)
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that "the specialist must be treated not as a competitor, but, on the
contrary (at least for a narrow 'normal' price range) as a price
administering monopolist or oligopolist."'1 3 In part his conclusion
depends on the assertion that the specialist knows the demand and
supply curves through his "book" and can "choose to end up at the
spot which is most favorable to him from among all the points that
constitute the market's offer curve."' 4
Any economic analysis of the specialist's role must also consider
the obligations of the specialist both under the securities laws and the
applicable rules of the stock exchanges. While economic theory is
practically limited by the specialist's legal obligation, that theory
should be influential in interpreting or formulating particular rules
within the legal framework. Since obligations may differ as the time
period is lengthened, the specialist's economic role can be classified
into three time periods: short, intermediate, and long run. The unique
nature of the specialist's function suggests a fourth
classification-sudden price fluctuations. While the latter category
other specialists [in other securities]," id. at 43, he concluded that "an enumeration of the forces
of competition is not by itself, convincing evidence of competition; the large share of trading in
which the specialist does not participate is somewhat more convincing of the absence of 'natural
monopoly' conditions." Though not specificially mentioned by Demsetz in his consideration of
his second competitive force (competing markets), a number of over-the-counter market makers
in listed securities (commonly called "the third market") compete with the specialist. See
generally Comments of Weeden and Co. on SEC Releqse No. 8791 (Feb. 12, 1970). However the
impact of this third market competition may be somewhat limited in that (i) the transactions
are not publically reported and (2) a large percentage of the volume in this market is in relatively
large blocks of stock which many argue are not part of the normal specialist auction market
system. See text at notes 155-59. See generally R. Doede, The Monopoly Power of the New
York Stock Exchange (Ph.D. thesis at University of Chicago).
13. W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 22 (1965). The term
"monopolists" is defined as the individuals "who 'administer' prices in a manner which
promotes their profit" as opposed to "competitors" who "determine their purchases in accord
with an independently established demand schedule. . . whose variable is price." Id. at 23 n.12.
14. Id. The economic value of the "book" is a disputed issue. Without doubt it is "an
indicator of public interest in a particular security.' SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 76. However,
many argue that the "book" often indicates the opposite of what one might expect-a book
with many sell orders may suggest a possible price rise since many sophisticated investors who
expect a price rise have placed sell limit orders in the book to take advantage of the anticipated
rise. If this theory is correct, the "book" may signal the direction a stock might be heading but
not through a traditional analysis of a supply and demand curve. Id. Moreover, to the extent
large blocks are not shown to the specialist, he may not be aware of the true supply and demand
curve.
Vernon suggested that orders in the "book" do not create trends but indicate the level of
resistance that must be met by price movement. VERNON 66 n.14.See also BUSINESS WEEK, May
9, 1970, at 108.
[Vol. 1970:707
Vol. 1970:707] STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIALIST
generally occurs within the short run, it warrants special attention
because it involves unique legal and economic considerations. 5
Short Run
The primary emphasis on the role of the specialist has always been
on his short run" value to the market. 6 He is obligated to reduce
temporary disparities between supply and demand in order to
facilitate a fair and orderly market. However, the meaning of
"temporary disparities" is unclear, since the time duration of the
specialist's short run obligation may depend upon the particular facts
of the situation. Arguably, in certain instances, his obligation may be
for only a few hours or less if his economic capability as a dealer is
threatened by a deluge of orders. Thus the specialist's obligation to
maintain a fair and orderly market is limited in the sense that no one
expects him to go bankrupt performing his daily duties. His
monopolist's or oligopolist's role is further limited since the direction
in which he is obligated to administer the price of his specialty stock is
against the market trend. To evaluate the specialist's performance the
NYSE uses the "tick test" to determine if he is acting to maintain a
fair and orderly market.17 By this test, specialist purchases below and
sales above the last different price are deemed stablizing and therefore
proper."8
The specialist has a certain amount of discretion in exercising his
short run obligation. In some situations, he has no choice but to enter
the market as dealer and consequently is obliged to be a price
administrator. Other situations, however, do not necessarily require
15. Professor Baumol suggests that four tasks should be considered in an economic analysis
of the stabilization function of the specialist including:
(i) reduction in the magnitude of long-term price trends; (2) reduction in the magnitude
of very short-term oscillations resulting from the discontinuous flow of supplies and
demands (in thin markets); (3) reduction in the amplitude and frequency of other price
fluctuations of moderate amplitude; (4) reduction in the magnitude of sudden price moves
which constitute temporary crises. W. BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 30-31.
The specialist is not expected to affect long run prices (task 1) but does have an obligation to
maintain a continuous market (task 2). The problem, according to Baumol, lies in tasks 3 and 4.
In sudden price movements (task 4), as at the time of President Eisenhower's heart attack, the
specialist may be driven by his own self-interest to play the role of stabilizer to the extent he feels
the price of the stock will rebound and hence assure him a quick profit.
16. See generally NYSE, Now, ABOUT THE SPECIALIST. . . (1969).
17. Other tests include the participation ratio and the carry-over position. See generally S.
ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS 197 (1966); SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 101-06.
18. For additional explanation see S. ROBBINS, supra note 17, at 196-97. To the extent the
"tick test" is used to demonstrate whether the specialist is administering prices against the
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his entry into the market nor do they foreclose his participation. For
example, if the highest bid on the "book" is for 100 shares at 20 and
the lowest public offer is at 20 3/8, the specialist might in certain cases
have discretion to either place his own bid or withhold himself from
the market. If the situation were changed so that the lowest offer was
at 24, making the spread four points, the specialist would be obliged
to enter the market as dealer. In this instance he would be required to
administer the price of the stock. But depending on numerous
considerations including the last sale price of the stock, competition
from both regional stock exchanges and the third market, and
volatility of the stock, he has a certain amount of discretion in
determining how to enter the market-as a bidder, offeror, or
both-and at what price. Hence, even when he is under an obligation
to administer the price of the stock, the manner in which he exercises
this obligation is somewhat discretionary so long as his action
ultimately promotes a fair and orderly market. It should be noted that
while many monopolists and oligopolists are regulated as to the price
they may charge, the specialist, because of the very nature of the "free
market'" could not be so regulated.
In considering the specialist's short run value to the market, a
problem arises in determining when "temporary disparities between
supply and demand" cease to be temporary. The answer arguably
appears after the situation has occurred, making the short run
obligation as nebulous as the actions of market prices themselves.
Sudden Price Changes
The possibility of sudden large shifts in market prices provides a
major justification for the specialist's existence. The shift may result
on an individual stock-by-stock basis due to a public announcement
by management or from a sudden rise or decline in the general
market. While suspension of trading in the specialist's stock or in all
market trend, it applies by its very nature only on a trade-by-trade analysis. Hence, it is possible
that a specialist could, in the course of an hour, a day, or a week satisfy the "tick test" and yet
bp a net seller in a down market or a net buyer in an up market. For example, in an "up" rising
market there are still numerous minus ticks. As a result, he could limit his purchases to such
minus ticks and appear to be stabilizing when in fact he would be accelerating a rising market.
See id. at 198-99. In such a case, his obligation to promote a fair and orderly market might not
be satisfied. The "tick test" may also be satisfied by a random sequence of orders rather than
conscious specialist action. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2; at 102. Although the exchanges have devised
various tests such as the "tick test" to measure stabilization, the difficulty in defining the term
"stabilization" makes the task difficult.
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stocks will release the specialist from his obligation, 9 a considerable
economic dislocation will undoubtedly occur between the influx of
orders and the eventual suspension of trading. In the interim the
specialist is expected to add depth and liquidity to a market which
would otherwise be devoid of these characteristics. In two previous
sharp declines specialists have been net purchasers, but their partici-
pation probably depended not only upon their obligation but upon
their economic outlook. Although specialists were net buyers im-
mediately after President Eisenhower's heart attack and during the
sharp market decline of May 28, 1962, their stabilization effect on
these two occasions differed greatly.2 According to the Special Study,
one reason for the lack of substantial purchases by the specialists on
May 28 was their belief that this decline was non-temporary in na-
ture!' The stabilizing effect of the specialists on May 28 was widely
publicized by the NYSE, implying that at least the Exchange felt
that most specialists had met their obligations n The emphasis placed
on net purchases by both the NYSE and the Special Study indicates
that the characterization of the specialist as a stabilizing monopolist
or oligopolist definitely includes the daily periods of sudden price
movement. The extent to which the specialist must meet this obliga-
tion is difficult to determine; numerous factors including his capital
status must be considered.P The Special Study commented; "Obvi-
ously, no one person has the capital to stem a selling wave such as that
of May 28, but with his central location, the specialist is in a position
to cushion the public's selling by giving depth to the markets. . ... ,
19. NYSE rule 47 provides: "Floor Officials shall have power to supervise and regulate
active openings and unusual situations that may arise in connection with the making of bids,
offers or transactions on the Floor." NYSE rule 51 empowers a majority of the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and the senior Floor Governor to suspend trading in all securities whenever such
suspension would be in the public interest.
20. During the former decline, specialists were net purchasers of 595,550 shares, representing
20.4 percent of their total purchases and sales. During the May 28, 1962 decline they were net
purchasers of only 206,400 shares, representing 6.7 percent of their total purchases and sales.
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 112-13.
21. Id. at 113.
22. Id. at 97.
23. The additional factors requiring consideration include the price of the stock, the volatility
of the stock, and the specialist's present position in the stock. See note 71 infra.
24. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 121.
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The Intermediate and Long Run
The specialist's obligation to stabilize the market is reduced as the
long run is approached. Indeed, if such an obligation exists in the long
run, the auction market would be a manipulated, rather than a free,
market. The terms used to describe the specialist's function-"fair
and orderly market;" "temporary disparities between supply and
demand;" "liquidity and continuity,---as well as the "tick test" and
the limited capital requirement of the specialist place emphasis on the
specialist's economic role over the short run.75
. Regardless of the duration of the specialist's obligation, economic
.analysis of the specialist's role must necessarily consider Congress'
two basic aims that the stock market be "fair" and "orderly." ' ,
Professor Vernon commented:
A "fair" market . . . bears the connotation of a market in ,tich the
individual investor need not fear for the integrity of his broker, the safety of his
funds, or the possibility that price movements are being artificially controlled.
An "orderly" market is regarded as one in which there are no "sudden and
unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of securities" and consequently a
market which makes no unnecessary adverse contribution to the stability and
well-being of the public at large. The two major functions of regulation,
therefore, are carefully distinguished; the goal of fairness, directed primarily at
the protection of the individual, may be looked upon as something in the nature
of a police function, while the "orderly market" aim, an aim intended to
25. In this connection, two commentators stated:
The whole of the market is not necessarily the sum of its parts. Each individual
transaction by a specialist may have little impact on intermediate-term price trends if, as
the New York Stock Exchange proclaims, he acts merely to narrow the spread. On the
other hand, his overall impact is not necessarily neutral. This is particularly so to the
degree that technicians dominate the market, when specialists may set the tone for price
movements weeks ahead by strategic buying and selling, even without taking a significant
long or short position.
Where fundamentals are the major determinants of market decisions, the specialist can
exercise little influence on intermediate-term price movements. But when technical
factors assume a dominant role for individual stocks, he becomes more than a mere
catalytic intermediary. By helping to build a chart pattern, by "reinforcing a hold point"
or permitting his stock to "penetrate a support level," he can alter, as well as simply
react to, an externally determined supply and demand, and can be instrumental in
mapping its future price course for the forthcoming weeks. James &James, Disputed Role
of theStock Exchange Specialist, 40 HARv. Bus. REv. 133, 141-42 (1962).
26. One of the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act is to "insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets. ... Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]. The Commission rules regulating specialists should "restrict his
dealings . . . to those reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly
market." 1934 Act § I l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964). In connection with excessive off-floor
trading by members of the Exchange the standard of "a fair and orderly market" is also used,
1934 Act § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1964) (emphasis added in all quotations).
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benefit the general public interest, is more suggestive of the use by Government
of economic controls.
Clearly, [orderly market] was intended in some way to represent a market
which was free from "excessive speculation," a type of speculation which, we
are told, results "in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of
securities."
No agreement exists concerning the effect of speculation on stock
prices. Under one theory, the speculator stabilizes prices by
purchasing or selling as necessary to move prices toward an
equilibrium position. A contrary theory assumes that the speculator
will continue to follow trends past the equilibrium. Under the latter
hypothesis the mere presence of traders in the market can accentuate,
rather than dampen, fluctuations.2 Thus generalities are not possible.
Not all speculators follow, or in the case of specialists, should be
permitted to follow, a destabilizing pattern. The "bad" speculator
aggravates price trends by going with the trend; the "good"
speculator goes against the trend, thereby adding stability to the
market. 9 The "bad" speculator may have prompted Congress'
adoption of the "orderly market" standard. To the extent that the
specialist is not permitted to buy or sell except to promote a fair and
orderly market, he is prevented, at least on a trade-by-trade basis,
from being a "bad" speculator. Thus, the scope of his obligation
27. VERNON 132-35.
28. Stock market speculation has been described as follows:
Although speculation may actually stabilize prices, the writer is at a loss to find any a
priori reason why it should do so. . . .The speculator's concern is to make money out
of the movements of prices. The argument that speculation stabilizes is based on the tacit
assumption that the only movements which interest him are those in the direction of the
equilibrium price. The speculator is supposed, for instance, to refrain from selling and to
buy when the price is below the equilibrium figure. This will tend to send it up or to stop
its descent. When the equilibrium figure is reached, he will sell again and check the rise.
But, if the price is rising, why should he sell at that particular point?. Why should he not
rather buy more, or at least refrain from selling, and by so doing give added impetus to
the movement? ...
Indeed, it seems more likely that speculation would cause more and greater
fluctuations. The very presence in the market of large numbers of traders whose
purchases and sales ultimately cancel out brings capricious shifts in demand and supply
as all flock one way and then the other. Every movement must be accentuated by the
attempts of speculators to take advantage of it. As the movement slows down or stops,
anxiety to realize on their profits and to lay the basis for new ones may stop it completely
and turn it the other way, whereupon it will gain momentum again by the very actions
of the speculators themselves. E. CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
29 (1933).
29. The impact of speculation has been considered under the subject of "theories of
withholding." See C. HARDY, ODD-LOT TRADING ON THE NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 68-69
(1939). On the "good" and "bad" speculator, see VERNON 134-42.
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under the applicable rules of his exchange and the obligation imposed
by the 1934 Act and Commission rules thereunder are of importance
in limiting instability due to speculation?0
Some economists, including Professor Stigler, believe that the
specialist's ability to "predict changes in equilibrium prices, or, in
other words, how closely does he keep bid and ask prices to the levels
which in retrospect were correct" 3' should be a criterion for judging
his efficiency. To the extent specialists are able to estimate the future
course of events they would "smooth the path of the price
quotations. ' 3 Hence, the specialist's own profit motive as a
speculator, rather than any imposed obligation, would enable him to
perform his economic and legal roles. Stigler further criticized the
suspension of trading in a stock in an emergency situation, believing
that the mechanics of speculation would work as effectively here as in
a normal market.
Some disagreed with Stigler's approach. Considering the
proposed standard of market efficiency-the success of the speculator
in judging changes in equilibrium prices-commentators argued that
Stigler
implicitly assumes that speculators do not affect equilibrium price, so that the
existence of speculative profits is necessarily a reflection of the success of
speculators in anticipating movements in equilibrium price . . . .This is a
basic assumption . . . without justification . . . .[T]here are both theoretical
and empirical grounds for believing that the demand schedule of investors in
the stock market is greatly influenced by price movements, so that speculators
can profit substantially by trading actively which is destabilizing. For example,
if speculators make heavy net purchases of a security in a period when its
equilibrium price has risen moderately as a result of favorable financial news,
their activity may drive the price much higher than it would otherwise have
gone 3
Replying to this criticism, Stigler stated that he did consider the effect
of the speculator's activity by assuming "that the speculator's
balances are equal at the beginning and at the end of a speculative
interval."" The rebuttal to Stigler's reply concluded that Stigler's
30. The specialist's obligations will be discussed in greater detail below. See text
accompanying notes 38-60 infra.
31. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 1964 J. Bus. 133.
32. Id.
33. Friend & Herman, TheS.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 1964 J. Bus. 382,400. This type
of speculation seems to be the type labelled by Vernon as "bad speculation." See text at notes
29-32 supra.
34. Stigler, Comment, 1964 J. Bus. 414,420.
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economic modeP "assumes that the equilibrium price of investors is
not affected by price movements or by the speculator's effects on such
movements," 36 notwithstanding Stigler's contrary assertion.
Reference was again made to the substantial evidence indicating that
the speculator could indeed aggravate price movements and thereby
be destabilizing.
HISTORY OF REGULATION
Early Specialist Rules
The basic regulatory issues involving the specialist were delineated
in the House Report accompanying the progenitor of the 1934 Act:
The importance of the actual workings of the exchanges themselves...
should not be exaggerated. The stronger and more subtle economic forces
affecting speculation come from without the exchanges. But as this speculation
converges upon the exchanges, the control of the exchange mechanism is a
necessary part of any effective regulation. It is for that reason that the bill gives
the . . .[SEC] broad powers over the exchanges to insure their efficient and
honest functioning ...
No issue has been more disputed than that centering about the functions of
the specialist. There are many who believe that the exchange mechanism would
function better without the specialist [and] that the work done by the specialist
could be done more effectively by a clerk . . . clearing the orders in a purely
mechanical way. . . .[O]thers. . .believe that a specialist should be obliged
to act either as a dealer or as a broker and should not be permitted to combine
the functions of dealer and broker. .... It is generally admitted that there are
serious abuses in connection with the work of specialists .... [T]here are
inherent difficulties in the situation where under normal circumstances the
available orders are known to the specialist only-and perhaps his favored
friends-and not to everyone dealing in the security involved. Inasmuch as the
stock exchanges objected to the laying down of any statutory rule governing
specialists, their suggestion has been adopted of giving the Commission
effective power to control the activities of specialists and to experiment with
various devices of control.7
Section 11 (b) of the 1934 Act contains the governing provisions for
specialists subject to that Act.O
35. This was the Telser model which, according to Stigler, has as one of its components the
excess demand of the speculators. Telser, A Theory of Speculation Relating Profitability and
Stability, 41 REv. ECON. & STAT. 295 (1959).
36. Friend & Herman, Professor Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 1965
J. Bus. 106, 110.
37. H.R. REP. No. 1383,73d Cong.,2d Sess. 14-15 (1934).
38. 1934 Act § 1 I(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964), states:
When not in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
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In accordance with the 1934 Act39 the Commission prepared a
report to Congress in 1936 on the feasibility and advisability of the
complete segregation of the functions of dealers and brokers.
Concluding that such a segregation was not advisable at that time,
this Segregation Report"° also described the initial steps taken to
eliminate some of the undesirable consequences resulting from certain
dealer and specialist activities on exchanges including the formula-
tion a year earlier of sixteen proposed exchange rules 1 which were
implemented by all exchanges with minor modifications for the
particular requirements of each exchange. 2 One rule was similar to
section 11(b) and prohibited dealer trades by specialists unless
"reasonably necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a fair and
orderly market . . . .-3 The purpose of this rule was described as
follows:
investors, the rules of a national securities exchange may permit. . .(2) a member to be
registered as a specialist. If under the rules and regulations of the Commission a specialist
is permitted to act as a dealer, or is limited to acting as a dealer, such rules and
regulations shall restrict his dealings so far as practicable to those reasonably necessary
to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market . . . . It shall be unlawful for a
specialist or an official of the exchange to disclose information in regard to orders placed
with such specialist which is not available to all members of the exchange, to any person
other than an official of the exchange, a representative of the Commission, or a specialist
who may be acting for such specialist; but the Commission shall have power to require
disclosure to all members of the exchange of all orders placed with specialists, under such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. It shall also be unlawful for a specialist
acting as a broker to effect on the exchange any transaction except upon a market or
limited price order.
39. "The Commission is directed to make a study of the feasibility and advisability of the
complete segregation of the functions of dealer and broker, and to report the results of its study
and its recommendations to the Congress on or before January 3, 1936." 1934 Act § I I(e)
(formerly appearing as 15 U.S.C. § 78k(e); the section no longer appears but is noted following
15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1964)).
40. The Segregation Report was not directed solely at specialists, but at any member who
acts as both broker and dealer. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 48-50.
41. See SEGREGATION REPORT 166-70.
Six of the proposed rules dealt specifically with specialists and provided that no
member shall act as a specialist in any security unless registered as such by the exchange;
that a specialist's transactions should be limited to those reasonably necessary to permit
the specialist to maintain a fair and orderly market; that the specialist should not
participate in any joint account except with a partner or another member, that the
specialist should keep a legible record of his orders for a period of at least 12 months; and
that the specialist should not hold puts, calls, or other options in any security in which he
is registered as a specialist. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 42 .(1944).
42. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 42 (1944).
43. SEGREGATION REPORT 169. The impact of this rule was questioned. "[When the [NYSE]
promulgated a rule in May, 1935, the wording of which simply parroted the Act's general
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It represents an attempt to eliminate the dealer activities of specialists except
insofar as such activities allegedly perform a useful service to the market. In
view of the specialist'sfiduciary oblgation to buyers and sellers whose orders
he has accepted for execution; in view of his special knowledge and superior
bargaining power in trading for his own account; in view of his peculiar
opportunities and motivies for attracting public interest to the stock in which
he specializes; and in view of the undesirable effect which his trading may exert
upon the market; it was deemed essential by the Commission that the dealer
functions of the specialist be subjected to stringent control. The rule was
intended to allow him only sufficient latitude in his personal trading to enable
him to maintain a fair and orderly market in the securities in which he is
registered."
Finally, the Segregation Report recommended (i) increased emphasis
on the observance of rules against trading by the specialist for his own
account without affirmative justification and (ii) the development of
appropriate restrictions on the specialist's trading with his "book."45
Although the need for rules to restrict unnecessary specialist
dealer activities was emphasized, imposition of an affirmative
obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market was not
recommended. However, the Report recognized that specialists
voluntarily assume this latter obligation as "a matter of business
principle" since the specialist, by virtue of his combined broker and
dealer functions and his commission business, has an important
incentive to maintain a stable and orderly market4
In 1937 the Commission endeavored to implement these two
recommendations of the Segregation Report in the form of an
instructions, no real progress was made toward the regulation of specialists' trading" VERNON
71.
44. SEGREGATION REPORT 63 (emphasis added). At the time of the Report the SEC had not
had sufficient time to ascertain the effectiveness of these rules due to their evolutionary
character. Id. at 64.
45. Id. at I 11. In connection with the second point the Report suggested three prohibitions: a
restriction upon dealings with the book which have the effect of widening the quoted market; a
prohibition against dealings with the book which result in the establishment of a new high or low
price during the course of a trading day; and a prohibition against taking all the stock offered or
supplying all the stock bid for on his book at a particular price level, commonly known as
"cleaning up the book." Id. at n.4.
46. "The specialist is under no affirmative obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market in
the securities in which he specializes." Id. at 40.
47. Id. at 40-41. At the time of the Segregation Report specialists competed, creating a
particular incentive to specialists to voluntarily make an orderly market since, as the Report
believed, commission brokers would prefer to send their brokerage orders to the specialist who
made the best market. As indicated in note 11 supra, NYSE and Amex specialists no longer
compete, and this particular incentive has disappeared. However, the competition of the third
market and regional exchanges may create a similar inducement.
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"interpretation" of the uniform specialist rule"5 adopted in 1935 by
all exchanges having a specialist system!' The importance of the
interpretation, commonly called the Saperstein Interpretation ,5
warrants a brief summary. Compliance with the rule prohibiting a
specialist from acting as dealer except to maintain a fair and brderly
market was not to be evidenced'by proof that a specialist dealer trade
"had no undesirable effect or even no discernible effect, upon the
market."51 Rather, each transaction must be reasonably necessary to
maintain a fair and orderly market. The "negative" test to be used in
judging a lack of reasonable necessity is violated when the transaction
"is not reasonably calculated to contribute to the maintenance of
price continuity .. . [and to the] minimizing of the effects of
temporary disparity between supply and demand. 15 2 In addition, the
transaction must be considered in relation to the "immediate
condition of the market" and "the specialist's book." 3
Finally, the adequacy of the specialist's position in relation to the
"reasonably anticipated needs of the market"5 4 may be a
consideration in particular instances. The need to lessen "temporary
disparity between supply and demand" and the reference to
"immediate condition of the market" emphasize that the specialist
acting as a dealer is responsible only for short run market stability or
orderliness rather than intermediate or long term price trends or
volume. The adequacy of his position to the "reasonably anticipated
needs of the market" refers to the specialist's right to buy or sell in
anticipation of future price trends. This permits him to build up a long
position by trading in anticipation of a market rise and concomitant
increase in the number of buyers. As the market subsequently rose the
specialist would supply stock purchased earlier. If he refused to do
this, his long position could not be justified under the Saperstein
doctrine. Thus, the negative restriction can imply an affirmative
obligation to deal, creating a need for the specialist to enter the
market as seller rather than to refrain fiom dealing.
The Saperstein Interpretation further specified certain types of
transactions commonly considered unjustifiable including: a purchase
48. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
49. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1117 (Mar. 30, 1937).
50. David Saperstein was the Director of the Commission's Trading and Exchange Division,
now the Division of Trading and Markets.
51. Release No. 1117, supra note 53, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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above the last sale price; the purchase of all or substantially all the
stock offered on the book at the last sale price; and the supplying of
all or substantially all the stock bid for on the book at the last sale
price s
The Saperstein Interpretation, the last formal Commission
pronouncement on permissible dealer activities of specialists until the
Amex Report of 1962,56 evidently had little effect. In 1941 "statistical
evidence [failed]. to show any substantial change in the trading habits
of the specialist after the Commission's interpretation was made
public." 57
In 1938 the Commission and the NYSE commenced an
investigation of the financial status of Exchange specialists to
determine whether specialists were financially able to maintain a fair
and orderly market and whether an Exchange rule was necessary to
require that specialists have adequate capitalV8 In 1939, the NYSE
minimum capital requirements were set at $10,000 or the market
value of 100 shares of each specialty stock, whichever figure was
higher 9 This development implicitly recognized the specialist's
affirmative obligation to enter the market. If the specialist's only
obligation was the negative one described in the Saperstein
Interpretation and the Segregation Report-no affirmative
requirement to act as dealer but any such action must be in a
prescribed manner-arguably no mandate of a special minimum
capital requirement would be needed. The Exchange, by enacting a
minimum capital requirement under informal Commission prodding,
seemed to be requiring the specialist to affirmatively deal to make a
fair and orderly market, at least to the extent of his minimum
capital!'
COMMISSION RULES REGULATING SPECIALISTS
Commission Rule Jib-1
Commission rule I lb-1 governing specialists, implemented in
January, 1965, is principally based on section 1 (b) of the 1934 Act
which states in part that
[wihen not in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
55. Id.
56. See note 8 supra.
57. VERNON 73.
58. Id. at 74.
59. Id. at 74-75.
60. For a discussion whether the specialist's obligation goes beyond his capital requirement
see note 71 infra. In 1939, one author wrote that the specialist "is expected to 'make a market'
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may prescribe. . . the rules of a national securities exchange may permit...
a member to be registered as a specialist. If. . .a specialist is permitted to act
as a dealer . . . such rules and regulations [of.the Commission] shall restrict
his dealings so far as practicable to those reasonably necessary to permit him to
maintain a fair and orderly market. . .
The Commission's specialist rule provides that national securities
exchanges may permit a member to register as a specialist and to act
as both dealer and broker if the applicable exchange rules meet certain
criteria. The NYSE and Amex had permitted dual broker-dealer
functions even before the enactment of the 1934 Act, but the specialist
rule first embodied the Commission's formal acknowledgment of the
combined broker-dealer function performed by specialists.
Rule 1 lb-I provides that the rules of the exchanges must include
five basic provisions:
1. Adequate minimum capital requirements.
2. Affirmative requirements that a specialist engage in dealings
for his own account to assist in the maintenance, insofar as
practicable, of a fair and orderly market.. This is often described as
the "affirmative" obligation of the specialist to deal. "Substantial"
or "continued" failure by a specialist to engage in such a course of
dealings should result in the suspension or cancellation by the
exchange of the specialist's registration in one or more of his specialty
stocks.
3. Restrictions on his dealings so far as practicable to those
reasonably necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market. This is
often described as the "negative" restriction on specialists and
incorporates the Saperstein Interpretation.
4. Provisions defining the responsibilities of specialists acting as
brokers.
5. Procedures to provide for effective and systematic surveillance
of specialists'
The rule also establishes a procedure for Commission review and,
if necessary, disapproval of new exchange rules relating to
specialists 3 The Commission is given power to order the exchange to
by putting in a bid and an offer whenever no bids or 6ffers are made by other members at a
reasonable 'spread.'" C. HARDY, supra note 29, at 116 (emphasis added).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964). The Special Study had recommended that a Commission
rule be adopted under section II of the 1934 Act to enable the Commission to more readily
exercise regulatory control over the specialist. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 168. The full text of
section 1 (b) is reproduced at note 38 supra.
62. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.1lb-l(a)(2)(i)-(v) (1970).
63. The Commission has 30 days after the filing of a proposed rule to notify the exchange of
its intention to determine whether the proposed rule should be disapproved. The exchange has 60
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cancel or suspend a specialist's registration in one or more of his
specialty stocks upon finding that the specialist has made dealer
trades which are not part of a course of dealings reasonably necessary
to maintain a fair and orderly market, not effected in a manner
consistent with the rules adopted by such exchange, and thus a
violation of his "negative" obligation. However, if the exchange has
itself suspended or cancelled a specialist's registration, no sanction
shall be imposed by the Commission under this rule unless the
Commission finds "substantial" or "continued" misconduct by the
specialist. 4
Finally, the Release promulgating the new rule provided that only
the New York and American Stock Exchanges are to be subject to the
rule's requirements. The exemption of all other exchanges was based
upon their limited volume of transactions and "the fact that the
Commission had not made any studies of the structure of the regional
exchange specialist system."" s
days after such notification to present evidence or arguments in support of its position. After
consideration of all relevant material, the Commission may disapprove the proposed change or
addition in the rules. Id. § 240.1 lb-l(a)(3). This procedure should be contrasted with that of
rule 17a-8 and section 19(b) of the 1934 Act. Under rule 17a-8 each national securities exchange
must file any proposed amendment to its rules not less than 3 weeks before the amendment is to
take effect unless it is an emergency amendment. However, the Commission is not given any
power under this section to change the amendment. The rule itself states that notwithstanding a
failure on the part of the exchange to submit the amendment to the SEC, the validity of the
change will not be affected. Id. § 240.17a-8(d). Rule 17a-8 apparently applies to specialists'
rules also.
Section 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964), in contrast to rule 17a-8, gives the Commission the
power in 12 designated areas to make specified changes or additions in an exchange's rules and
practices after an appropriate request and hearing. However, since the specialist is not
mentioned within these 12 categories, arguably section 19(b) was not meant to apply, especially
since the specialist is covered under another portion of the Act-section 11 (b). Because of the
important role of the specialist and the broad power that is in section 19(b)-section 19(b)(1)
gives the Commission power to safeguard the financial responsibility of members; section
19(b)(3) refers to listing of securities; section 19(b)(5) refers to manner, method, and place of
soliciting business; and section 19(b)(13) refers to "similar matters"--it seems more likely that
section 19(b) is applicable to the specialist. However, although section I I(b) refers to both.
specialist and odd-lot dealers, section 19(b) refers only to odd-lot dealers. See 2 L. Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATIONs 3219 (1969 Supp.).
Rule I lb-I procedure does not permit the Commission to require a change in exchange rules
on its own initiative. However, it would appear that the Commission has the power from the first
sentence of section 11 (b) of the 1934 Act to require broad changes in such exchange rules or to
pass additional Commission rules regarding the specialist as may be "necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Thus, even if section 19(b) had limited
application to specialists, no void in Commission power would appear to exist in this Area.
64. Rule 1 lb-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lb-l(b) (1970).
65. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7465 at 3 (Nov. 23, 1964). Previous to this
exemption all exchanges with a specialist system were subject to the Saperstein Interpretation.
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Original drafts of the Commission rule sent to the New York and
* American Stock Exchanges apparently imposed an affirmative
obligation on the specialist to deal where necessary to maintain an
orderly market.6 6 However, the final version provides that the
affirmative obligation be included in an exchange rule. 7 The Special
Study had recommended that a Commission rule be adopted under
section 11 (b) to state an affirmative obligation to participate but
recognized that section 11 has no explicit provision requiring
specialists to participate in the market as principal.6 Possibly the
uncertainty concerning Commission authority9 and fear of increased
risk of private law suits against both the specialists and the exchange
based upon such a Commission rule70 led to the adoption of the
affirmative obligation to deal provision as an exchange rather than a
Commission rule.
The exchange rule must also require that the specialist engage in a
"course of dealings" to "assist" in the maintenance of a fair and
orderly market "so far as practicable," indicating that the
specialist's activities are not to be judged on the basis of one
transaction and that the amount of stablizing purchases or sales he
must accomplish is within reasonable limits. The measure of his
affirmative obligation to help maintain a fair and orderly market may
be related to the minimum amount of capital required to be
maintained by the exchange rule.'
The original draft of the rule sent to the NYSE and Amex
After promulgation of rule I lb-I, however, the regional exchanges are exempted from the
negative requirement of the Interpretation and the new affirmative obligation of the rule.
Regional exchanges may elect to pass their own rules to provide for such restrictions and
obligations. However, to the extent that such regional exchanges have rules and settled practices
governing the specialist, they are obligated under the self-regulatory provisions of sections 6 and
19 of the 1934 Act to enforce them. Additional consideration of regional exchanges is beyond the
scope of this paper.
66. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
88th Cong., lst& 2d Sess. 1252-53 (1963-64). These hearings present an excellent analysis of the
specialist system under stress resulting from the Kennedy assassination. Included in the hearings
is a Commission staff report on trading on both the day of the assassination and the next day in
which the market was open.
67. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
68. Compare SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 168 with id. at 89.
69. For a discussion of Commission authority in this area see note 63 supra.
70. For d discussion of potential civil liability for violation of an ex..iange rule, see text
accompanying notes 135-45 infra.
.71. Although there is general agreement that a specialist has no obligation to bankrupt
himself in a steeply rising or falling market, inflexible determination of the amount of his
obligation by his capital requirement is arguably incorrect. In certain instances his obligation
may be considerably more than this amount depending on the precise facts of a given case.
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apparently intended to directly impose the negative restrictions on
specialist dealing,72 but the final rule, perhaps to lessen the fear of civil
liability, required this restriction to be incorporated in the rules of the
exchanges rather than as a direct rule of the Commission.!3 A notable
difference exists, however, in the treatment of failure to meet the
affirmative rather than the negative obligation As noted above, the
Commission has the power under the rule to order the exchange to
suspend the specialist in the latter case. In the former case the
Commission has no such explicit authority; rule 1 lb-I merely requires
that exchange rules provide for the disciplining of a specialist who
violates his affirmative obligations. In the case of an exchange
neglecting to suspend or cancel the registration of a specialist for
failing to engage affirmatively in a course of dealings to assist in the
maintenance of a fair and orderly market, the Commission's remedy,
unless it were to promulgate a new rule under section 11 (b), would
appear to be under section 19(a)(1) of the 1934 Act Which permits the
suspension or withdrawal of the registration of a national securities
exchange upon the finding that the exchange has violated the Act or
any rule thereunder. 4 This is obviously a drastic and radical measure.
Prior to rule 1 lb-I there was no formal Commission rule on
specialists. Arguably, however, section 1 (b) was self-executing, and
the Saperstein Interpretation's negative obligation was in effect as a
Commission rule. Section 11(b) provides that "[i]f under the rules
and regulations of the Commission a specialist is permitted to act as a
dealer. . . such rules and regulations shall restrict his dealings so far
as practicable to those reasonably necessary to permit him to
maintain a fair and orderly market. . . ."5 Since the Commission in
fact always permitted specialists to act as dealers from 1934 to the
date of rule 1 lb-I, a possible inference is that specialists acting as
dealers were required to comply with the negative restrictions of
section 11(b). Accordingly, section 19(a)(3), providing that the
Commission may suspend or expel from a national securities
exchange any member thereof when the Commission finds that he has
violated any provision of or rule under the 1934 Act, may have been
applicable up to the passage of rule llb-1. However, since the
72. Hearings, supra note 66, at 1252.
73. This approach requires an interpretation that section ll(b)'s mandate that the
Commission establish rules to restrict specialist dealings is satisfied by the promulgation of
exchange rules with the same prohibitions.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(l) (1964).
75. Id. § 78k(b) (emphasis added).
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Commission did not adopt a rule until 1 lb-l was promulgated in
1965, arguably section 1 l(b.) was not operative in this regard absent
such a formal rule.
Other Regulatory Provisions
The specialist is, of course, also liable for any violations of other
federal securities laws including 1934 Act sections 9(a) and 10(b)70 and
rules lOb-5 77 and lOb-675 thereunder which refer to manipulation. The
Commission has stated that "Section 11 of the Exchange Act grants
to the Commission broad and direct rulemaking power over the
activities of specialists and adoption of proposed Rule 1 lb-I would in
no way foreclose the Commission from exercising its residual power
of direct regulation. ' 79 In United States v. Re,8 1 the court considered
whether the defendant Amex specialists were acting "in the legitimate
role of specialists, not as market manipulators."'" Rejecting the
defendants' contention that the anti-manipulative provisions "are
irreconcilably inconsistent with the legitimate duty of the specialist,"
the court concluded that "[i]nherent in the jury's verdict of guilty...
was the determination that the Res were not performing the function
of specialists in their dealings .... ,,82
A specialist may possibly violate his duty to create a "fair"
market without violating the anti-manipulative sections of the federal
securities laws. The term "fair" would thereby have ethical
connotations somewhat similar to NYSE rule 401 which places a
standard of good business conduct upon NYSE members.83 Since
"fair" is part of rule I1 b- I of the 1934 Act, this ethical connotation is
incorporated in federal as well as exchange standards concerning
specialists' activities. The Commission has stated that the specialist
76. Id. §§ 78i(a)& 78j(b).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
78. Id. § 240.10b-6. In a recent administrative proceeding, Jaffee & Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8866, April 20, 1970, the Commission in discussing rule lOb-6 with
regard to a market maker stated: "A specialist, no less than an over-the-counter market maker,
is subject to the prohibitions of the Rule if he is a participant in a distribution [other than one
exempted under lOb-6(a)(10)]." Id. at 6 n.12a. Query can a specialist comply with his duty to
maintain a fair and orderly market and, at the same time, violate rule lOb-6? Compare id. with
id. at 13 (Commissioner Smith dissenting).
79. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7432 at 8 n.2 (Sept. 24, 1964).
80. 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1964).
81. Id. at 314.
82. Id. at 315.
83. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
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also functions as a broker executing orders entrusted to him by other brokers
on behalf of their customers in the securities in which he specializes. Thus, he is
in a position of trust and confidence with his customers and obligated within
the terms of his agency to the strict standards of loyalty, disclosure and fair
dealing required of fiduciaries.
It is arguable that a violation of a duty to keep a "fair" market could
also lead to possible civil liability8 5
EXCHANGE RULES REGULATING SPECIALISTS
The NYSE adopted a number of significant changes in its
specialist rules as a result of the Commission's promulgation of rule
1 lb-1. The current framework of rules is described in this section with
reference to any changes made as a result of rule I lb-I and the
recommendations of the Special Study. 6 The central provisions
governing specialists are set forth in NYSE rule 104 and the
supplementary material thereto8 7
The first paragraph of rule 104 is almost identical to the rule in
effect at the time of the Saperstein Interpretation in 1937. The initial
84. Re, Re and Sagarese, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6900 (Sept. 21, 1962).
85. See text accompanying notes 135-48 infra.
86. Similar changes were adopted by the Amex. This discussion relates principally to NYSE
rules with appropriate reference to Amex rules.
87. Relevant portions of NYSE rule 104 are as follows:
Rule 104. No specialist shall effect on the Exchange purchases or sales of any security in which
such specialist is registered, for any account in which he, his member organization or any
participant therein is directly or indirectly interested, unless such dealings are reasonably
necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a fair and orderly market, or to act as an odd-lot
dealer in such security.
.10 Regular specialists.-[Registration required].
The function of a . . .regular specialist . . . includes . . . the maintenance, in so far as
reasonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market on the Exchange in the stocks in which he is
so acting. ...
(1) The maintenance of a fair and orderly market implies the maintenance of price continuity
with reasonable depth and the minimizing of the effects of temporary disparity between supply
and demand.
(2) ...[lit is commonly desirable that a member acting as specialist engage to a reasonable
degree under existing circumstances in dealings for his own account when lack of price
continuity, lack of depth, or disparity between supply and demand exists or is reasonably to be
anticipated.
(3) Transactions on the Exchange for his own account effected by a member acting as
specialist must constitute a course of dealings reasonably calculated to contribute to the
maintenance of price continuity with reasonable depth, and to the minimizing of the effects of
temporary disparity between supply and demand, immediate or reasonably to be anticipated.
Transactions not part of such a course of dealings are not to be effected.
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provisions of rule 104.10 setting forth the specialist's affirmative
obligation generally were, with certain differences, effective for many
years'prior to the Special Study and are now required to be included
pursuant to SEC rule llb-l(a)(2)(ii). Moreover, as a result of
recommendations of the Special Study, the phrases related to
"depth" were added. In this regard, the Commission stated that
a related finding [of the Study] was [that] there was too much emphasis upon
transaction by transaction price continuity, as distinguished from the concept
of depth, i.e., the ability of the market to supply and absorb reasonable
quantities of stock before significant price changes occur. . . .[The] problem
has been met by an amendment to existing rules which specifically adds the
concept of market depth to the obligations of specialists as dealers.p
In announcing this amendment, the NYSE asserted that the term
"reasonable" in rule 104.10(l)(2) and (3) "implies that the
appropriate degree of participation will vary with conditions in each
stock-price range, volume, etc.-and with over-all market
conditions." 9
The general statements in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of rule 104.10
provide only the most general guidelines. For example, no one expects
(4) A specialist's quotation . . . will bear a proper relation to preceding transactions and
anticipated succeeding transactions.
(5) Transactions. . .are to be effected in a reasonable and orderly manner in relation to the
condition of the general market, the market in the particular stock and the adequacy of the
specialist's position to the immediate and reasonably anticipated needs of the market. The
following types of transactions to establish or increase a position are not to be effected except
when they are reasonably necessary to render the specialist's position adequate to such needs:
(A) a purchase at a price above the last sale in the same session;
(B) the purchase of all or substantially all the stock offered on the book at a price
equal to the last sale, when the stock so offered represents all or substantially all the stock
offered in the market; and when a substantial amount ofa stock is offered at a price equal
to the last sale price thepurchase of more than 50% ofall the stock offered
(C) the supplying of all or substantially all the stock bid for on the book at a price
equal to the last sale, when the stock so bid for represents all or substantially all the stock
bid for in the market; and when a substantial amount of a stock is bid for at a price
equal to the last saleprice, the supplying of more than 50% of all the stock bid for and
(D) failing to reoffer or rebid where necessary after effecting transactions described
in(A), (B) and (C) above.
Transactions of these types may, nevertheless, be effected with the approval of a Floor
Official or in less active markets where they are an essential part of a proper course of
dealings and where the amount of stock involved and the price change, if any, are normal
in relation to the market.
The portions in italics were added in 1965. The equivalent Amex provision is Amex rule
170.
88. Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 4-5.
89. NYSE Memorandum to Members and Allied Members 8 (Sept. 24, 1964).
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a specialist to become insolvent to stem a long-run market
downswing. On the other hand, the specialist is required to buy within
reasonable limits to meet temporary disparities in public supply and
demand. The difficulty arises in actually measuring the limit and
scope of his obligation. Suppose that the exchange delays the opening
of a stock due to a sudden influx of public sellers. Assume further that
(a) the specialist must expend $50,000 of his own capital to meet the
sell orders, without a significant drop in price; or (b) the specialist
would have to expend $6 million to meet the sell orders at a price
which is reasonably close to the last sale. What is the specialist's
obligation in each case? What standards should the exchange use in
measuring the specialist's precise dollar obligation under rule 104? A
paradox may exist: If the specialist has a legal obligation to buy or
sell only in cases of relatively non-serious imbalances, then the
economic value of the specialist is somewhat lessened. In such non-
serious cases, the public imbalance of buy and sell orders is relatively
small and price gyrations may not be great even without the specialist.
On the other hand, imposition of liability on the specialist to stem
great imbalances of demand would call for greater capital resources
than most specialists can command by themselvesY0
Paragraphs (5)(B) and (C) of rule 104.10, prohibiting what is
commonly called "cleaning up the book," were amended in 1965 to
include a specific statement regarding the 50 percent limitation on
specialists' transactions in connection with establishing or increasing
positions in specialty stocks. The first clause of paragraph (5)(B)
prohibits the purchase of all or substantially all the stock offered on
the book at a price equal to the last sale when the stock so offered
represents all or substantially all of the stock offered in the market.
Hence, if 2,000 shares were offered on the book and 4,000 offered in
the crowd, this clause standing alone would appear to permit the
specialist to buy the full 2,000 on the book for his own account, plus
perhaps all or part of the stock offered in the market. However, the
second clause limits the specialist to 50 percent of all the stock
offered, subject to the general restrictions against unnecessary
dealing. These prohibitions against cleaning up the book are
refinements of prohibitions dating back to the Saperstein
90. Recently, there has been a development to have certain financially strong members of
exchanges affiliate with specialist units. See the text accompanying note 153 infra.
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Interpretation and apply to transactions which "establish" or
"increase" a position-long purchases or short sales.
Paragraph (6), added in 1965, provides limitations on the
specialist's transactions in connection with liquidating or decreasing a
position and applies to long sales and purchases to cover a short
position. Without prior approval of a Floor Official, the specialist
must avoid liquidation of all or substantially all of a position by
selling stock at prices below the last different price or by purchasing
stock at prices above the last different price. The specialist must also
maintain a fair and orderly market during liquidation. The
Commission announced that these changes were made in response to
the Special Study's conclusion that NYSE rules did not adequately
"inhibit potential disruptive market effects that could follow from an
extensive liquidation or reduction of a specialist's position." 1
Rule 104 was also modified in 1965 to state that a specialist should
avoid participating as a dealer in opening or reopening a stock in such
a manner as to upset the public balance of supply and demand, unless
the conditions of the general market or the specialist's position make
it advisable to do so in light of the reasonably anticipated needs of the
market.12  This change complied with the Special Study
recommendation that specialists be prohibited from changing prices
at openings against the direction indicated by public supply and
demand? 3NYSE rule 103 contains the requirement that no individual may
act as a specialist without being registered with the ExchangeP In
1965, the rule was modified to provide that if the Exchange finds a
91. Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 4. The equivalent Amex prohibitions on liquidations
and cleaning up the book appear in Commentary .01 and .02 to Amex rule 170.
92. NYSE rule 104.11. A similar Amex rule appears as Commentary .04 to Amex rule 170.
The "opening" function of the specialist was considered to be very important by the Special
Study. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 137.
93. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 168. The supplementary material to NYSE rule 115 contains
additional regulations on orders at openings. Rule 115.20(2) provides that in arranging an
opening a specialist is required to assure that each market order he holds participates in the
opening transaction. However, if such a market order is for more than 100 shares, the size of the
transaction which establishes the opening or reopening price fixes the amount that the market
order is entitled to participate in at the opening or reopening. This limit would appear to be
subject to the specialist's affirmative obligation to deal under Commission rule I lb-I and
NYSE rule 104. Rule 115.20(2) further provides that market orders have precedence over
limited orders at the opening or reopening. Limit price orders to buy at a higher price than
that at which the security is to be opened are treated as market orders. Limit price orders
to sell at lower prices than the opening price are treated as market orders. NYSE rule
115.20(2).
94. See note 41 supra.
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substantial or continued failure to engage in a course of dealings
directed toward the maintenance of a fair and orderly market, the
specialist's registration in one or more of his specialty stocks shall be
subject to suspension or cancellation by the Exchange. This
amendment had the effect of implementing paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of
SEC rule 1 lb-1.
Capital requirements of NYSE specialists require each unit to
have the ability to assume a position of 20 trading units-2,000 shares
in a 100 share unit stock-in each common stock in which it is
registered 5 The requirement was 400 shares prior to 1964 and was
raised to 1,200 shares by the Exchange concurrently with the
enactment of rule llb-1 6 This capital requirement is not to be
confused with a net capital requirement, since the specialist himself is
not required to have net capital sufficient to assume a position of 20
trading units. The specialist may fulfill this capital requirement either
with his own funds or by borrowing from a bank or another member
organization?7 The NYSE also adopted a rule in 1965 requiring that
it be informed immediately by telephone of any intention to terminate
95. NYSE rule 104.20. The Amex requirement is 20 trading units or $100,000, whichever is
greater, and was changed recently from ten trading units of $50,000. Amex rule 171.
96. Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 3. The Special Study had recommended this change.
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 168.
97. The specialist is exempt from the initial margin requirements imposed by the Federal
Reserve System under its regulations T and U. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.106 & 221.102 (1970). The
NYSE specialist is also exempt from the net capital requirements of NYSE rule 325 as long as
he does not engage in public business. However, the maintenance margin requirements of NYSE
rule 431 are to some extent applicable in that an amount borrowed from a clearing agent in
excess of the general maintenance margin rule will be a debit to the clearing agent in the
computation of his net capital. NYSE rule 431(c)(6).
1934 Act rule 15c3-1 requires that in most cases all brokers and dealers maintain a minimum
net capital of $5,000. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1970). Exchanges with a capital requirement
more stringent than that of 15c3-1 are exempt. NYSE rule 325 requires that most members have
a net capital position of $50,000. Amex rule 446 is similar. However, both exchanges currently
exempt specialists who do not do a public business from the requirementsof their net capital
rules, and presumably they are also exempt from 1934 Act rule 153-1.
The relevance of not having a net capital rule applicable to the specialist lies in the fact that his
"buying power" will be increased. If the specialist were obliged to maintain a minimum net
capital of $50,000, each dollar in excess of minimum net capital that the specialist receives will
enable him to buy 3-1/3 times that ambunt in securities since 30 percent of the market value of a
security is deducted in ascertaining its value for net capital purposes. This percentage is called
the "haircut." For example, if a specialist firm had $50,001 in net capital, its security position
could be improved by a maximum of $3.33 by using the extra $1 and borrowing $2.33. After
deducting the $2.33 increase in liabilities and a 30 percent "haircut," its net capital would
decrease $1. Thus it would now have $50,000 in net capital. If there were no net capital
requirements the purchasing power of that same dollar would be four times its value due to the
present 25 percent maintenance margin standard.
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or change existing financial arrangements or to issue margin calls to
specialists. Both the Amex and NYSE agreed to inform the
Conimission immediately by telephone if a specialist would
apparently not be able to meet promptly a margin call or to continue
in business because of his inability to obtain new financing0 These
provisions enable the exchanges to enforce the restrictions on
specialist' liquidations where margin calls might cause the specialist
to start liquidating his position and in general to police the financial
responsibility of specialists.
A number of rules deal with the agency or brokerage functions of
specialists. The Special Study recommended that the NYSE and
Amex should adopt rules prohibiting specialists from servicing the
accounts of their own public customers 9 to eliminate the potential for
discrimination. 00 The Amex argued that the effect of this
recommendation would be to diminish the capital resources of many
specialists, since firms forced to split into two or more firms-one
handling public customers, the other acting solely as
specialist-would be smaller and weaker. The Amex also argued that
such a ban would prevent it from interesting firms now engaged in a
public business in specializing. 1 The NYSE, asserting that specialists
had not given preferential treatment to their own public customers,
contended that it would be undesirable to have a "blanket prohibition
against specialists' handling public accounts."'0 2 As a compromise,
the NYSE adopted a rule prohibiting specialists from accepting an
order for his specialty stock directly from the issuer, any officer,
director, or 10 percent stockholder of the issuer, pension or profit-
sharing funds, or institutions such as banks, insurance companies,
and mutual funds 0  Supplementary material to,&te rule provides that
98. Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 7; NYSE rule 104.30; Amex rule 171.01. This
amendment implemented the essence of the Special Study recommendation. SPECIAL STUDY, pt.
2, at 170.
99. The Special Study recommendation on this subject stated: "To keep within as narrow
limits as possible the conflicts of interest inherent in a specialist's combination of functions,
NYSE and Amex specialists and their firms should be prohibited from servicing the accounts of
public customers, or receiving commissions on such accounts 'introduced' by them at other
firms.' SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 170.
100. Id. at 154-57.
101. Hearings, supra note 66, at 444-45.
102. NYSE Memorandum, supra note 89, at 16.
103. NYSE rule 113 also prohibits the identification of an order in a specialty stock with
an account and provides for the reporting of specialty stock transactions made for accounts
related to his member organization.
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it is contrary to good business practice for a specialist or his firm to
"popularize" any security in which he is registered.
The Special Study has recommended that all securities owned by a
specialist and in which he is registered should be kept in one trading
account rather than segregated in long-term investment accounts for
tax or other purposes. 04 The existence of such accounts was
considered inconsistent with the Saperstein Interpretation in that the
specialist was made a long-term investor regardless of his obligation
to buy and sell stock only when reasonably necessary to maintain a
fair and orderly market."5 The final determination was that under
certain circumstances a specialist may have an investment account.
NYSE rule 104.12106 provides in part that purchases for the
investment account must be reasonably necessary to permit the
maintenance of a fair and orderly market. Moreover, no stock which
was purchased on destabilizing ticks may be placed in the account.
These requirements are designed to reconcile the existence of the
investment account with the negative and affirmative obligations of
the specialist under NYSE rule 104 and Commission rule lIb-1. In
addition, the specialist's income data reported to the NYSE must
"reflect, by speciality stock, any gain or loss occurring within an
investment account.' " 07
The practice of stopping stock was criticized by the Special
Study."' If a floor broker is dissatisfied with the then quoted market,
he may utilize this device by asking the specialist for a "stop." If
granted, the broker is assured a price for his customer no worse than
the current market. If a better price is available at a later time, the
order will be executed, and the "stop" is null and void. The Special
Study noted that usually the "stop" would be filled from the book
The similar Amex provision is rule 190. Recently both the NYSE and Amex have discussed
arrangements with large brokerage houses which would enable these firms to affiliate with the
specialist to help the latter's capital position. Discussions concerning changing rules which
might prohibit these potential affiliates from doing certain types of public business have also
been reported. The NYSE has formed a special committee to study the matter. Washington
Post, Jan. 9, 1970, § D, at 7, col. 1.
104. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 169. The Internal Revenue Code provides that a dealer in
securities may receive capital gains treatment for the sale of a security if within 30 days of
purchase the security was identified as held for investment and not after this 30 days at any time
held primarily for sale to customers. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1236.
105. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 133-35.
106. A similar rule was adopted by the Amex. Commentary .07 to Amex rule 170.
107. NYSE rule 104.50.
108. SPECIAl. STUDY, pt. 2, at 169.
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and only rarely by the specialist as dealer."9 In 1965 NYSE rule 116
was modified to provide that with certain limited exceptions, a
specidlist may not. stop stock against the book or for his own account
if he" holds an order capable of execution at the "stopped" price. In
those limited cases when a stop may be granted, the guarantee must
result in narrowing quotations on the exchanges."' The Special Study
noted that the NYSE permitted "stopped" stock transactions to be
omitted from the tape;"' rule 126112 was amended to eliminate this
practice.
Several other exchange rules directly regulate the dealings of the
specialist. In certain circumstances he is permitted to execute "off the
floor" transactions for his own account without satisfying orders
from his book,"3 but he may not accept "not held" orders which
permit discretion as to time and price of execution."' Dealings to
adjust LIFO inventory in a specialty stock are prohibited." ' Also a
specialist may not pay a better price for a block for his own account
than his brokerage customers pay for other pieces of the same
block."' In successive dealer transactions with his customers' orders a
109. Id. at 150-54. The danger with "stopped" stock was that the customer's order on the
book allocated to the "stop" would not receive an execution if the order with the benefit of the
stop received a better price later during the day. Thus the allocated stock might fail to obtain a
timely execution, especially if the market subsequently moved away from its limit price.
110. In announcing this rule change the NYSE stated that "stopping" stock permits the
investor to have his order executed at a better price than otherwise. NYSE Memorandum, supra
note 89, at 12.
111. The Special Study recommendation on the subject provides: "The present policy of the
NYSE which permits executions resulting from stops to be omitted from the tape should be
changed by a rule requiring that every transaction taking place on the floor be reported on the
tape. The policy requiring the selling broker to report transactions should be strictly enforced,"
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 169.
112. NYSE rule 126 Supplementary Material.
113. Prior approval of a Floor Governor is required. NYSE rule 107.
114. NYSE rules 123.20 and 123.44. "Not held" orders are also prohibited by section 11 (b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964), which limits the specialist to accepting market or
limit orders. The danger in these orders is that the great discretion given to specialists would
permit them to manipulate prices. There is no ban on t. mbers other than specialists in handling
"not held" orders. The Special Study recommended that "[t]he existing ban against specialists'
accepting 'not-held' orders should continue. If necessary, consideration should be given to
increasing floor brokerage rates to compensate floor brokers adequately for their efforts in
handling discretionary orders." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 169.
115. NYSE rule 104.13 provides: "LIFO transactions.-A member acting as a specialist
may not effect transactions for the purpose of adjusting a LI FO inventory in a stock in which he
is so acting except as a part of a course of dealings reasonably necessary to assist in the
maintenance of a fair and orderly market." This was designed to prevent year-end purchases or
sales for the purpose of obtaining tax advantages under the LIFO system of valuing inventory.
Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 5.
116. NYSE rule 104.10(7).
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specialist must charge all of them the best price which any of them
receive." 7 No member, including a specialist, may fill buy or sell
orders accepted by his organization as principal, except under
certain exceptions."18
There are also several additional general proscriptions on a
specialist's conduct. He is prohibited from participating in "pool
dealing" in his specialty stock'19 and may not hold any interest in a
joint account for specialty stock, except with another member
organization. 20 Proxy contest activity, directorships, and other
business dealings with companies in whose stock he is registered are
also forbidden.' 2' The specialist is subject to certain other rules of the
exchange involving record keeping for "own account" transactions,
22
117. NYSE rule 104.10(8).
118. This applies to all members; one requirement is that the member, including specialists,
may buy the securities provided that he has offered the same on the Floor at a price which is at
least an eighth higher than his bid. The converse must be done if he is selling to the customer's
bid. NYSE rule 91. In the case of specialists, additional requirements are added. NYSE rule
91.20 provides that "a specialist occasionally may effect a transaction as principal against an
order which has been entered for an account carried by the specialist's organization . . .. The
customer . . . should be contacted promptly .. .so that he may then accept or reject the
transaction." (emphasis added). See also NYSE rule 113, note 103 supra.
119. NYSE rule 105.
120. NYSE rule 94. See note 41 supra. The Amex has a similar rule. Amex rule 175. The
Amex recently studied investment partnerships or "'hedge funds" and considered the
participation of specialists in such partnerships. The American Stock Exchange stated:
The Exchange's survey noted that a few member organizations represented by a
limited partner in an investment partnership have an affiliation with a specialist unit. The
attention of such organizations is directed to Rule 175(b), which prohibits any specialist,
or any member organization in which a specialist is a partner or voting stockholder, from
acquiring any interest or participation in any nonmember joint-account for buying or
selling on the Exchange any security in which the specialist is registered. Attention is also
directed to Rule 187, which generally prohibits any specialist from effecting any off-the-
Floor transactions in any security in which he is registered, for any account in which he
has an interest; and Rule 188, which prohibits any specialist from effecting any
transaction in any other security traded at the post at which he is assigned as specialist.
Accordingly, each specialist who is directly or indirectly interested in an investment
partnership should take the necessary steps to insure that these rules are observed. Amex
Information Circular No. 79-69 at 8-9.
121. NYSE rule460.
122. The record must show the time sequence of transactions, and specialists are required to
report such transactions on periodic call from the Exchange. Particular reporting requirements
are imposed with respect to specialists who operate on a LIFO basis for valuing inventory and in
the case of investment accounts. NYSE rules 104.12, 104.13 and supplementary material
104.50. The Amex has a similar requirement in rule 191 except that the report must be
automatically filed with the exchange on a daily basis. See the text accompanying note 115
sup ra.
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auction market rules,'2 and responsibility for loss if an order which
should have been executed is not reported. 24
One of the most important rules regulating the specialist, as well
as other members, is the requirement that members and member
organizations shall follow the principles of good business practice.'2
This rule is potentially one of the most important rules regulating the
specialist. It might be applicable where there would be a violation of
principles of good business without another rule to directly fit the
particular facts.
In the past, exchange surveillance of the specialist has been
criticized as inadequate,'26 although a number of exchange rules are
-directed toward this function. For example, the specialist is required
to keep a record of purchases and sales initiated on the floor "in stock
in which he is registered, for an account in which he has an
interest."'1 The recorded information must include the price, number
of shares, time of transaction, and an indication if the sale is either a
123. The auction market at the specialist's post is conducted according to specific rules of
priority, precedence, and parity. In all cases, the highest bid and the lowest offer prevail. NYSE
rule 71. The rules for priority, parity, and precedence where bids and offers are made at the
same price are stated in NYSE rule 72.
A specialist may retain priority on a bid under rule 72(a), but when bidding for his own
account to establish or increase a position he cannot have parity with an off-floor order or
precedence based on size over such an order except in certain limited cases. NYSE rules 72(b),
(c), (d), & I 12.24(b).
124. NYSE rule 123.32 is an intricate rule allocating responsibility between the specialist
and the customer's broker if the specialist fails to execute an order he should have handled.
Regardless of the division of liability, query whether in the circumstances under this
rule, there can be a limiting of any civil liability of the specialist to the public customer. It might
be argued that the customer did not implicitly agree to the terms of rule 123.32 notwithstanding
the fact that he had reason to believe the order would be executed on the floor of the NYSE. This
theory assumes there is no implicit agreement by a customer to accept the contents of the NYSE
rules. One may further question whether any negligence of the customer's broker in not
promptly requesting, as he is expected to under the rule, the specialist for a status report is
imputable under agency principles to the customer.
If the customer had explicitly agreed in a customer's agreement to be subject to NYSE rules it
still does not automatically follow that rule 123.32 applies since there is a serious legal question
whether the small print of a customer's agreement could incorporate by reference all the rules of
the NYSE which are themselves subject to change after the customer's agreement is executed.
125. NYSE rule401.
126. Surveillance of the specialist's activities was considered at length in the Special Study.
The existing techniques of the exchanges were not considered adequate, and several
recommendations for improvement were made including: investigation of an automated system
for reconstruction of the specialist's book; regular reporting of specialist's income, categorized
between brokerage and dealer income; and development of standards for evaluating the
specialist's performance. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 170-71.
127. NYSE rule 104.50 Supplementary Material.
[Vol. 1970:707
Vol. 1970:7071 STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIALIST
short sale or an opening sale and must be reported as requested by the
Exchange. A designation indicates whether each transaction was on
a plus tick, minus tick, zero plus tick, or zero minus tick.121 The
specialist is also required to prepare a monthly report of his long
position in his investment account. 30
The exchange evaluates the specialist's activities through the
information provided in these reports. One of the tests used is the
"tick test" which has been discussed above; 3' however, no objective
criteria are established by the exchange rules to judge the results of the
tick test, although the specialist is restricted from assigning specialty
stock to an investment account unless he has maintained "a
stabilization rate of at least 75%, measured by the Tick Test . .. for
the day of purchase, and for the entire calendar week encompassing
that day.' 32 Both exchanges have assigned additional personnel for
floor surveillance and have taken other steps to comply with the
recommendations of the Special Study.-1' However, N YS E specialists
have recently been criticized for their performance and for their weak
capital position.
CIVIL LIABILITY
The extent of civil liability for violations of exchange rules is a
matter of considerable controversy' and was litigated in Colonial
128. Id.
129. Id. A plus tick indicates a price above the immediately preceding transaction; minus tick
is below the preceding transaction; zero plus tick is the same as the last transaction when the last
price change was a plus tick; and a zero minus tick is the same as the last transaction when the
last price change was on a minus tick. Id.
130. NYSE rule 104.12.
13 1. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. A particularly pertinent criticism made by the
Special Study was that the NYSE closely reviewed each individual transaction, yet paid little
attention to the overall effect of the specialist's activities. SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 101-06.
NYSE rule 112(d)(3) contains a tick test for registered traders.
132. NYSE rule 104.12.
133. Release No. 7432, supra note 79, at 6-7.
134. See generally Fiske, Can the Specialist System Cope With the Age of Block Trading?
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1969, at 29. See also R. NEY, THE WALL STREET JUNGLE
(1970).
135. See generally Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities
Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966). Lowenfels
concluded that "to sustain private actions and impose liability for violations of exchange rules
in certain limited areas is not only consistent with the legislative plan, but also necessary for the
effectuation of the purpose underlying securities regulation-the protection of the investing
public." 66 COLUM. L. REV. at 30. See also Allen, Liability under the Securities Exchange
Act for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1493 (1970); Shipman, Two
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Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.131 Judge Friendly stated that
[a] .particular stock exchange rule could . . . play an integral part in SEC
regulation . . . . [T]he court must look to the nature of the particular rule and
-its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a
federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than
when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for
implication would be strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown
to the Common Law.1Y
The Colonial case was followed by Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc.3" where the issue was whether a violation
of NYSE rule 405, the,"know your customer" rule, gave rise to civil
liability. The defendant argued that section 27 of the 1934 Act 3 '
granted jurisdiction to the federal court only for violations of either
the Act itself or its rules and regulations and not rules of the NYSE.
The court answered that "[t]here is nothing inconsistent with this
section in holding that violations of Rule 405 may be actionable as a
'duty created by this chapter' inasmuch as Rule 405 was promulgated
in accordance with Sections 6 and 19 of the Act, even if Rule 405 is
not in itself to be considered a rule 'thereunder.' "4 The Court then
articulated a test to be used in determining whether there is implied
civil liability:
The touchstone for determination whether or not the violation of a particular
rule is actionable should properly depend upon its design "for the direct
protection of investors."...
Such a breach of fair practice undermines the protection of investors and
surely "play(s) an integral part in SEC regulation" of Exchanges and their
members.'
Another case after Buttrey is Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis' which involved stock certificates
Current Questions Concerning Implied Rights of A ction Under the Exchange Act: Authority
of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Re-
quirements, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 925, 963-1010 (1966); Note, Private Actions as a Remedy
for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1970).
136. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). Since at least 1944,
exchanges themselves, as distinguished from their members, have been held liable for a viola-
tion of their duty to enforce rules adopted pursuant to section 6 of the 1934 Act. Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Pettit v. American Stock
Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
137. Id. at 182.
138. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
140. 410 F.2d at 142.
141. Id.
142. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92373 (N.D. Ill., filed April 7, 1970). Motion for leave to file an
amended complaint was gianted on April 27, 1970.
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endorsed by the owners in blank with signatures guaranteed by a
broker. An employee of the broker allegedly stole the certificates and,
after several unsuccessful attempts to sell them, finally sold them
through the defendants. The plaintiff based his suit in part on NYSE
rule 405. The court determined that rule 405 did not impose an
obligation, based in part upon the conclusion that under the Uni-
form Commercial Code the securities were fully negotiable. In dictum
the court stated that even if rule 405 did impose an obligation of care,
"4mere negligence" cannot be a ground for imposing civil liability
under an exchange rule. Buttrey was distinguished on the grounds that
its facts were "tantamount to fraud." However, the court's
interpretation is open to doubt; although the court in Buttrey did state
that the facts involved fraud, the standard articulated for civil liability
did not require such a finding.
Assuming that a rule of an exchange may give rise to civil liability
there is at the outset the issue whether any of the exchange standards
applicable to specialists are "rules" at all. In this connection many of
the provisions regulating specialists on both the NYSE and Amex are
found in the supplementary material or commentary to the rules
themselves. For example, much of the material concerning a
specialist's transactions with the book or liquidating his position is
found in the "Commentary" to Amex rule 170 while the analogous
NYSE provisions are found in the rules themselves. In this regard the
issue appears to be whether "commentary" or "supplementary
material" is a rule. In DeRenzis v. Levy'1 3 Judge Frankel stated in
dicta that the test to be used is "at a minimum, [whether] the
propositions in question were promulgated, recorded, and known as
rules-or, at least, something closely approximating rules." '44
143. 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In this case the Commission filed an amicus curiae
brief in which it stated:
Similarly, private enforcement based upon violations of some stock exchange rules is
necessary "to make effective the congressional purpose" and to provide a "necessary
supplement" to the exchange's and the Commission's own action ....
...In some areas the existence of a private right of action for damages might inhibit
the self-regulatory body from promulgating new rules in areas beyond the Commission's
own authority to do so. In others, the imposition of darfiages may actually impede rather
than advance the self-regulatory purpose. Therefore, a careful examination must be made
with respect to the particular rule to determine whether the implication of a private right
of action would in fact further the overall objectives of the federal securities laws.
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, De Renzis v. Levy, id. (citations omitted).
144. 297 F. Supp. at 1001. Judge Frankel stated that there are "troublesome questions" as to
the methods or procedures by which exchanges promulgate rules in view of the possible need that
there be "minimal standards of notice" and a chance for affected persons to be "heard." Id. at
1001-02 n.5.
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Clearly, any material which rule I lb-1 requires to be an exchange rule
would be considered as such whether or not labeled as a rule.
Once the barrier is crossed concerning the existence of a "rule,"
the issue becomes whether the rule plays an "integral part" in
Commission regulation and is designed "for the direct protection of
the investor." At the time of the promulgation of rule I lb-1 it might
'have been assumed that requiring the exchanges, as opposed to the
Commission itself, to make the specialist's rule an exchange rule
would shield the specialist from civil liability. However, with the
Colonial and Buttrey cases this proposition appears to be incorrect.
The different treatment of the negative Saperstein and positive
obligation of the specialist under rule 1 lb-I further complicates
matters. Since both section 11(b) of the 1934 Act and rule I lb-1 seem
to give greater emphasis-at least by way of Commission
enforcement-to the Saperstein approach it might seem that if there is
the possibility of any liability under the Colonial and Buttrey tests
then the stronger implication might result when the specialist disrupts
the market.' However, in view of the importance of the affirmative
obligation to maintain an orderly market, this implication seems to
be incorrect.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The increasing percentage of institutional trades on the New York
Stock Exchange has placed an unprecedented strain on the specialist
system. More than 50 percent of public transactions on the exchange
are currently represented by institutional orders,' and the total of
purchases and sales by such financial institutions was $80 billion for
1969 and $65 billion for 1968, a great increase over the 1967 total of
$49 billion.'47 Accompanying this growth, large block transactions
have continued to increase in number. Indeed, in 1968 block trades of
10,000 shares represented 10 percent, of the total reported volume on
the NYSE; for 1969 this ratio increased to over 14 percent."8
Paralleling this development is an increase in the average number of
shares per sale printed on the NYSE tape. The average number of
shares pef sale was 257 in 1967, 302 in 1968,141 and 356 for 1969.1'1
145. For a discussion of an NYSE rule which attempts to allocate responsibility for the
failure to execute a customer's order, see note 124 supra.
146. NYSE, PUBLIC TRANSACTION STUDY- 1969 at 3 (1970).
147. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1970 FACT BOOK 48.
148. Id. at 12.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Id. For the first three quarters of 1969 the average number of shares per sale was 367.
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The tremendous growth of institutional participation in the
markets places an increasing burden on the specialist's capacity as
dealer to meet the demands created by such large transactions. The
specialist must stand ready within reasonable limits to purchase or
sell from or to the public investor where temporary disparities occur
in the public demand or supply and is expected to add depth to the
markets. The task is obviously easier when he is dealing with the
relatively small purchase and sales orders of the ordinary public
investor. When large institutions attempt to purchase or sell blocks
amounting to millions of dollars, a new magnitude of economic stress
is placed upon the specialist. The former Chairman of the
Commission, Manuel Cohen, stated that "[t]he specialist was
developed to provide liquidity and correct temporary imbalances in
the supply and demand for particular stocks, and no longer can,
alone, meet the large needs of the institutions."'' s Ralph Saul,
President of the American Stock Exchange, has expressed similar
doubts about the capabilities of the existing specialist system to
handle current market conditions.152
Growth of so-called block positioning member firms of the NYSE
in recent years has resulted from the new needs of the institutional
markets. Such firms have the capital, experience, and willingness to
purchase large blocks from institutional sellers and sell positions so
acquired in small pieces on the floor of the exchange. In the past year,'
a number of such firms have joined specialist units on the Amex and
the NYSE.15 3 Such mergers or associations by the specialists and
block positioning firms will increase the capital resources of
specialists and perhaps better enable them to handle the increasing
NYSE, INSTITUTIONS AND THE STOCK MARKETS (1969). Thus there appears to be a slight
decrease in the average shares per sale in the last quarter of 1969.
151. Address by SEC Chairman Cohen, American Bankers Ass'n, Feb. 11, 1969.
152. [I]t seems to me that we have to reexamine our specialist standards in light of
underlying changes in our market-a process that is already underway. . . .Is the
specialist expected to buy an entire airline when a number of institutional portfolios
decide to sell an airline stock and there are no substantial matching buyers? After an
institution has aggressively purchased a stock and then immediately liquidates, does the
specialist have an obligation to participate in depth to absorb portfolio sales? It would
appear that his capital resources must be significantly increased over current levels in
order to handle such transactions. Address by Amex President Ralph Saul, Jan. 1968.
153. The Wall St. Journal, Dec. 11, 1969, at 4, col. 5; Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1970, § D, at
7, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Mar. i1, 1970, at 61, col. 3. Bear Stearns and Co. and Shields and Co.
have already begun sharing specialists' books on the Amex. Five or six other firms are reported
to have made application for specialist assignment on the Amex. In addition, Bear Stearns & Co.
now shares ajoint account with a NYSE Specialist Firm.
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demands of institutional investors. If additional block positioning
firms join specialist units, specially tailored exchange specialist rules
may be required to facilitate the handling of block transactions in
addition to whatever regulatory provisions are deemed necessary by
the Commission.'
One of the issues raised by the growth of block transactions is
whether block transactions fall within the scope of an auction market
involving ordinary specialist activity. The Commission recently
invited responses to certain questions resulting from the public
investigatory hearings on the exchange commission rates.' One of
the questions asked was whether block transactions should be
"excluded from the scope of any exchange rules which . . . fix
commission rates. . -"."I" It was pointed out that the
question assumed the definition of a "block" transaction to be a transaction in
which a member firm, by reason of the size of the order in relation to
conditions in the exchange auction market, reasonably concludes that it is in
the interest of the customer to search and negotiate for a matching interest on
the other side of the market (including negotiating as principal with the
customer) rather than to accept or submit a bid or offer in the ordinary course
of the auction market. 57
154. The Amex has recently announced that it is considering requiring block positioners to
formally register as block traders so as to be more closely regulated. Wall St. Journal, June 10,
1970, at 40, col. 2. •
If many block positioning and other firms with public customers join specialist units, the
exchanges may attempt to change NYSE rule 113 and Amex rule 190 which do not permit a
specialist to have institutional customers. His competitors--block positioners and third market
makers-have no such restriction. They are able to obtain commission business from
institutions in the many cases where they find both sides to a transaction (such transactions
where the broker-dealer, acting as agent, finds both buyer and seller, are commonly called
crosses). It is very possible that rules 113 and 190 impose, therefore, a significant competitive
disadvantage on the specialist. The third market firm and the block positioner may be more able
to position large blocks and do it as a service for their institutional clients because of the
commission business they obtain on a regular basis from institutions. Furthermore, it is possible
that institutions may give them easy crosses to handle to reward them for block positioning.
Significant conflicts of interest which these rules were addressed to are discussed at note 99 supra
and accompanying text.
The specialist who presently cannot have institutional customers may be less willing to
position all or part of a ldrge block since he may not receive direct commission business from
institutions.
155. "A public hearing commenced on July 1, 1968 as a fact-finding inquiry to obtain
information relevant to the existing structure and level of commission rates of the nation's
securities exchanges and to provide a basis for identifying and balancing the policy and other
considerations which lay behind those rates as well as an opportunity to assess proposals for
change." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791 at 1 (Dec. 31, 1969).
156. Id. at4.
157. Id.
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The question raised the basic issue of whether block trades are
negotiated trades falling outside the scope of the auction market and
therefore outside the scope of exchange rules on fixed commissions.
The negotiating is often done in the member firm's office and not on
the floor of the Exchange, although the actual executing after a
successful negotiation will take place on the floor of the exchange.
Some observers feel that block trading and block positioning have no
significant relationship to the auction market and belong rather to the
negotiated over-the-counter market.15 1 The NYSE, on the other hand,
believes that block transactions do belong to the auction market.'
Certain observers claim that the specialist could not be expected to
continuously quote a bid and ask which is valid for huge blocks of
stock. Moreover, to the extent a specialist positions a large block, he
creates a conflict of interest, since he may be pressured to sell his
block regardless of his obligation to sell only in a rising market.
Furthermore, the large position may lessen his ability to enter the
market as a purchaser pursuant to his obligation as a specialist.
The impact of institutionalization of the markets is beyond the
scope of this article, but the subject is currently being researched by
the Institutional Investors Study of the SEC."'0 The pressures on the
specialist structure are recognized to be enormous by representatives
of the industry, and the future of the specialist system in its present
form will depend upon methods developed to handle these
pressures.
Another recent innovation is the growth of so-called computerized
markets. One such market is the Institutional Networks Corporation
or Instinet, a computerized system whereby institutions are able to
trade with each other without the intervention of an exchange, a
specialist, or a block positioning firm.' Direct sales between
institutions have commonly been designated as the Fourth Market-a
158. In the third market a number of large broker-dealers who are not members of the
NYSE make a market in NYSE listed stocks in competition with both the NYSE specialist
and block positioners. These firms deal "net" with their customers and do not generally charge
a commission. See generally Testimony of M.A. Shapiro, SEC RATE STRUCUTRE HEARINGS
3904-4003 (1968); Testimony of First Boston Corp., id. at 3369-478, Testimony of Weeden &
Co., id. at 1459-1508, 4006-67.
159. See NYSE Memorandum in response to Release No. 8791, supra note 155.
160. Pub. L. No. 90-438 (July 29, 1968). Congress stated that this study must include an
evaluation of the effects of institutions upon the maintenance of fair and orderly securities
markets.
161. For a general description of Instinet, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8661
(Aug. 1, 1969).
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market where institution meets institution directly without the
assistance of an exchange or a broker. This market, previously
handled exclusively by telephone communications between
institutions, can now also be handled via the I nstinet computer.' The
risk to the specialist is that the success and proliferation of such
computerized markets may minimize the role of exchanges and
specialists in this insitutional trading. Moreover, the possibility of
complete computerization of the specialist function also exists.,"
CONCLUSION
The specialist is a key figure in the operations of the New York
and American Stock Exchanges. In his role as dealer, which is the
most important and most controversial of his two functions, he is
expected to add depth and continuity to the auction market. The
consensus of the exchanges and many economists has been that the
specialist, acting as dealer, is vital to the maintenance of an orderly
market. An orderly market, a term admittedly difficult to define,
manifests several characteristics over the short-run: prices move in
162. In addition to. Instinct other automated trading systems have been established and
placed into operation, for the block market. These two systems are described as follows:
Another automated trading information system is sponsored by AutEx Service
Corporation ("AutEx") . . . [and] would be available only to institutions and broker-
dealers. It would allow the anonymous communication of indications of interest to buy
or sell blocks of I000 or more shares. . . . Unlike the Instinct system, the AutEx system
as presently planned would not be programmed to allow actual negotiation or execution
of transactions. Negotiations would be handled by broker-dealers. . . . Executions
would be effected either on a national securities exchange or over-the-counter without
reference to the system ....
The New York Stock Exchange also plans to sponsor an automated trading
information system, called the Block Automation System ("BAS"). Member firms
would be able to enter indications of interest in the BAS. An institutional subscriber
could also enter an indication of interest, and in this latter respect BAS appears to be
similar to Instinct. The institution would not, however, communicate directly with
another institution and must designate a member of the New York Stock Exchange to
act as its broker in any subsequent negotiations. As in the AutEx system, the planned
BAS program would not allow negotiation or execution. Negotiations would have to
take place between the two member brokers designated by the institutions, and
executions would be subject to rules requiring exchange members' transactions to be
effected on an exchange. Release No. 8661, supra note 161, at 1-2. All three systems arc
currently in operation.
163. One author suggested that "in a fully automated system the specialists' function nmust
also be automated. This means the system must be programmed to maintain orderly markets
without the intercession of the human element. The easiest way to do this is to have the exchange
itself assume-the specialists' responsibility." Youngbloop, The A rgumnent for a Publicly Owned
Stock Exchange, 1969 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 104A. *
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small and continuous gradations; such minute price changes occur
with respect to relatively large transactions as well as small--the
market has depth; and the specialist is able and willing to step in as a
significant buyer in falling markets and as a seller in rising markets.
Moreover, the specialist is expected to solve the time discontinuity
problem by virtue of his willingness to buy when no public buyer
appears and to sell when no public seller appears. The underlying
rationale is that the successful performance of the foregoing functions
will improve the auction market, enhance public confidence in the
operations of the market, and enable investors, at least in the short-
run, to buy or sell stocks promptly and at prices which are very close
to that of the previous transaction. The rules of the exchanges and the
Commission are designed to require specialists to fulfill the foregoing
purposes.
Of crucial importance in any consideration of the specialist is the
continuous exchange surveillance over his performance. The failure of
specialists to enter a declining market, or the actions of specialists in
selling long or short in bear markets, could, if not prevented or
curtailed by proper surveillance, contribute to the public's lack of
confidence. In a bear market, such derilictions would unnecessarily
contribute to the cumulative build-up of investor concern. The
important items to monitor in a surveillance program include, in
addition to the continual review of specialists' performance in
particular stocks on particular days, sufficiency of capital, profit and
loss information, continuance of proper financing arrangements with
banks and member firm creditors, and review of margin calls from
creditors of specialists. The exchanges must obtain data on a current
basis, and the Commission must be promptly informed of significant
developments in these areas.
The specialist system is facing unique challenges. Various
representatives of the securities industry representing different
interests have attempted to predict future developments of
varying kinds. The developers of Instinet hopefully anticipate a
market in which institutions trade with each other without the use of
specialists or exchanges. Third market makers criticize the ability of
exchanges to handle blocks, predict the accelerated growth of their
market, and call for liberalization of exchange rules which restrict
members from dealing in the third market. The NYSE and Amex, on
the other hand, believe that institutional trading belongs on the floor
of the exchange and will continue to contribute to the depth and
Vol. 1970:707]
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liquidity of the auction market in which specialists play a pivotal role.
In this connection, they are considering an increased role for block
positioning firms with specialists. In that case, the specialist rules
which evolved to fit the needs of individuals may have to undergo
profound changes to satisfy the new situation and the increasing role
of block positioners. Even if the exchanges succeed in their efforts to
bring and keep blocks on the floor of the exchange, the changes in
structure due to the growth of blocks may result in the growth of a
situation which many feel currently exists-that is, two de facto
separate markets, a negotiated market for blocks and the traditional
specialist auction market for individuals.
